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not constitutionally impermissable.
Petitioner claimed that the sentencing phase did not narrow
the class of death eligible murderers. Id. at 553. Lowenfield objected to the fact that the sole aggravating factor found by the
jury during sentencing was identical to an element of the
underlying crime. The Court ruled that "petitioner's argument
that the parallel nature of these provisions requires that his
sentence be set aside rest on a mistaken premise as to the
necessary role of aggravating circumstances is not an end in
itself, but only a means of sufficiently guiding the jury's discretion and narrowing the class of death-eligible convicts. This
guiding and narrowing can be done in both the guilt stage or
the sentencing stage. Id.
The Court concluded that state statutes fulfill the constitutional requirements in one of two ways. A legislature may narrow the definition of capital offenses, so that the jury responds
to the constitutional concerns by finding guilt; or the legislature
may have a broad definition of capital crimes which require
narrowing through the use of aggravating circumstances at the
sentencing phase. Id. at 555. The court held that the Louisiana
statute sufficiently narrowed the definition of capital murder to
meet the constitutional requirements. Thus, the finding of an
independent aggravating factor was not necessary. The Louisiana statute both narrows the class of defendants, and allows
for proper consideration of mitigating factors to produce a correctly based decision. Id.

ment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Id. at 555. The fact that the statutory aggravating
factor duplicated an element of the underlying crime prevented
the adequate guidance of the jury's discretion as to the propriety of the death sentence, in that it led the jury to decide the
point in the guilt phase instead of the penalty phase. Id. at 556.

APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
Although at first glance the United States Supreme Court
ruling in Lowenfield appears contrary to the spirit of Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and Greg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976), the Lowenfield decision is technically correct. The
Court previously held that the constitution requires an individualized determination as to the culpability of the defendant, and the appropriateness of the death penalty. This has
traditionally been implemented through the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors. The Supreme Court now explains that a death sentence can be based on a statutory definition of capital crimes which sufficiently narrow the scope of
death-eligible murderers. The jury is still required to consider
any factors in mitigation in order to reach a constitutionally
sufficient individualized decision.
The Lowenfield case is not directly applicable in Virginia,
which has a narrowed definition of capital murder, Va. Code
Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C)(1988). Also, the unconstitutionality of the
Louisiana factor, on its face or as applied, was not an issue in
Lowenfield. At least one of Virginia's aggravating factors is
constitutionally suspect. (See summary of Maynard v. Cartwright, infra). Whether these differences are constitutionally
significant must await further answers from the Court. (Sandra
Fischer)

d) Separate Opiniofn
Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joins, and
Justice Stevens joins as to Part I, dissenting. Part I: The jury
charge and supplemental polling gave the impression that the
judge was anxious for a quick verdict, collectively creating an
unacceptable risk of coercion. Id. at 555-556. Part II: The
death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punish-

MILLS v. MARYLAND
486 U.S.
FACTS
Ralph Mills was convicted of the first-degree murder of his
celmate in the Maryland Correctional Institute in Hagerstown,
Maryland, and sentenced to death. The jury was provided with
a verdict form which required, in part, that it be marked "yes"
as to every mitigating circumstance listed that had been found
by a preponderance of the evidence to exist, and "no" as to
factors not so found. The jury was then to weigh the mitigating
circumstances found against aggravating circumstances. The
jury marked "no" in every case, and where the form asked for
any other mitigating circumstances found to exist, marked
"none," thereby sentencing Mills to death.
Mills appealed, claiming that the State's death penalty, as
applied to him, was unconstitutionally mandatory because it required the imposition of the death sentence if the jury
unanimously found an aggravating circumstance, but could not
agree unanimously as to the existence of any particular
mitigating circumstance. The defendant hypothesized that "even

,
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if some or all of the jurors were to believe some mitigating circumstance or circumstances were present, unless they could
unanimously agree on the existence of the same mitigating factor, the sentence necessarily would be death.
The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, Mills
v. State, 310 Md. 33, 527 A.2d 3 (1987), interpreting the statute
as requiring unanimity to accept or reject any mitigating factor,
noting that in the absence of unanimity on the ultimate question of what sentence should be imposed, the statute (Md. Ann.
Code, Art. 27, §413 (1987 Repl. Vol.)) required life imprisonment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Mills v. Maryland,
108 S.Ct. 1860 (1987).
HOLDING
a) Constitutionality of a statute that requires a jury to
unanimously agree on the existence of any mitigating circumstance in order to introduce that evidence in the
weighing process.

Citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the Mills
Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Blackmun, found it
beyond dispute that, in a capital case, "the sentencer [may] not
be precluded from considering, as a mitigatingfactor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that a defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death." at 1865.
The Court also cited the corollary "that the sentencer may
not refuse to consider or be precludedfrom considering any
relevant mitigating evidence." Mills, at 1865, citing Eddings,
455 U.S. at 114.
The court decided that, if the defendant's interpretation is
correct, the "failure [of the jury] to consider all of the
mitigating evidence risks erroneous imposition of the death
sentence in plain violation of Lockett, [and] it is our duty to remand this case for resentencing." Mills, at 1866 citing Eddings,
455 U.S. at 117.
b) Probability that reasonable jurors could have drawn such an
interpretation of the law from the instructions and verdict
form employed in this case.
The Court, demanding "greater certainty in death cases that
the jury's conclusion rested on proper grounds," stated that
"[u]nless we can rule out the substantial possibility that the jury
may have rested its verdict on the 'improper' ground, we must
remand for resentencing." Mills, at 1867.
Reviewing the judge's instructions and the verdict form, the
Court, "while conceding that the Court of Appeals' construction of the jury instructions and verdict form is plausible"
could not conclude "that the jury did not adopt petitioner's interpretation of the jury instructions and verdict form." Id.
To support its conclusion, the Court noted that a new form
had been promulgated on an emergency basis by the court of
appeals, "expressly incorporatfing] the unanimity requirement
as to both accepting and rejecting aggravating circumstances"
and completely rewriting the mitigation section. Id., at 1869.
The Court inferred from these changes some concern that juries
could misunderstand the previous instructions. Id.
Judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals was vacated
and the case remanded for resentencing.

APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
Mills is not directly applicable to Virginia, principally
because the Virginia scheme does not require "balancing" of
particular circumstances found to exist. See Briley v. Bass, 584
F.Supp. 807 (E.D. Va.), aff'd 742 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1984).
Virginia juries are permitted to fix a sentence at life imprisonment even if aggravating factors are found, and may consider
any evidence in mitigation. Mills, however, does make it reversible error to mislead a jury into thinking that particular
mitigating factors must be unanimously agreed upon. A better
practice might be the giving of an instruction to this effect.
Failure to give such an instruction was held not to be error in
Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 212-213. The reason
given by the Virginia Supreme Court, however, was not responsive to the issue:
Since only by unanimous agreement can the
death penalty be inflicted, a disagreement by
one or more of the jurors as to the proper
sentence would, by statute, result in a life
sentence. Id., at 212.
The response does not at all address the contingency that a jury
given a unanimity requirement as to aggravating factors might
not disagree that death was the proper sentence because it
mistakenly thought it must also be unanimous as to a particular
mitigating circumstance.
Mills, on its facts, makes it reversible error to mislead a jury
into thinking that particular mitigating factors must be
unanimously agreed upon. Virginia Code provides for sentencing procedure in §§19.2-264.3 and 19.2-264.4. There it will be
noted the verdict form used by the jury sets out the aggravating
factors to be considered but lists no mitigating factors
specifically. In this way, Virginia does not limit the jury's consideration of any factor they deem mitigating. See Watkins v.
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 331 S.E.2d 422 (1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1099 (1986). The question is whether juries require any instruction on how to consider mitigating factors, in
contrast to their duties respecting aggravating factors. (Helen
Bishop)

